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Adam Smith’s Theory of Value: 
A Mathematical Statement of his Market Price Discovery Process 
Sabiou M. Inoua and Vernon L. Smith 
Chapman University     
Abstract: The relevance of Adam Smith for understanding human morality 
and sociality is generally accepted; witness the growing interest that his 
work is stimulating among scholars of various academic backgrounds (phi-
losophers, political theorists, sociologists, economists). But, paradoxically, 
Adam Smith’s theory of economic value enjoys a less prominent stature to-
day among economists, who, while they view him as the ‘father of modern 
economics’, considered him more as having had the right intuitions about a 
market economy than as having developed the right concepts and the tech-
nical tools for studying it. Yet the neoclassical tradition failed to provide a 
satisfactory theory of price formation owing to the dominant axiom of price 
taking behavior; for if everyone takes prices as given, how do these prices 
emerge in the first place? Who is giving the prices? One early escape from 
this crucial price-discovery problem consisted of assuming that all traders 
should have complete information of supply and demand and the conse-
quent equilibrium prices (Jevons, [1871] 1888) ; the other, that formed the 
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basis of general equilibrium theory, imagines a fictional auctioneer who 
finds the equilibrium prices by trial-and-error adjustments or tatonnement 
(Walras, [1874] 1954). Adam Smith’s theory of the market mechanism (Ch. 
7, Book 1, Wealth of Nations, 1776), as we shall argue in this paper, offers 
the right conceptual framework for understanding competitive price dis-
covery, for which we offer a mathematical formulation. Mathematically, 
the driving force behind competitive price dynamics is not excess demand 
per se, but its integral; we make this concept, explored at the beginning in 
experimental economics (Smith, 1962), part of our formalization of classical  
competitive price dynamics. Finally, we explain key propositions of Smith’s 
theory of value in the light of this mathematical formulation.   
1 Introduction  
The relevance of Adam Smith for understanding human morality and soci-
ality is generally accepted; witness the growing interest that his work is 
stimulating among scholars of various academic backgrounds (philoso-
phers, political theorists, sociologists, economists). But, paradoxically, 
Adam Smith’s theory of economic value enjoys a less prominent stature to-
day among economists, who, while they may view him as the ‘father of 
modern economics’, consider him as having had the right intuitions about 
a market economy but not as having developed the right concepts nor the 
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technical tools for studying it. The dominant historiography of economics 
draws indeed a picture of classical economics in which Adam Smith is over-
shadowed by the English classical followers (notably Ricardo), and it por-
trays the classical school itself as eclipsed in the 1870s by the neoclassical 
school. Yet the new school faces important difficulties, whose solution par-
adoxically leads back to the old school. First, on theoretical grounds: an im-
portant theorem established in the 1970s (by Sonnenschein, Mantel, and 
Debreu) uncovers an intrinsic lacuna in the core principle which consists of 
deriving economic regularities from individual rationality (for example the 
theorem shows that the demand of utility-maximizing agents is essentially 
arbitrary in the aggregate). So, we are left open to the possibility that eco-
nomic regularities are better viewed as emergent properties in the classical 
school. Moreover, experimental economics established the stability, effi-
ciency, and robustness of the market mechanism under conditions in which 
we should expect ‘market failures’ according to the standard neoclassical 
theory: markets with a few traders, who only know their private valuations 
of the good, and who generate the prices through their bids and asks, that 
converge to equilibrium and maximum efficiency. Adam Smith’s theory of 
the market mechanism (Wealth of Nations, Book I, Ch. VII), as we shall ar-
gue in this paper, offers the right conceptual framework for understanding 
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competitive price discovery, for which we offer a mathematical formula-
tion.  
Our formulation derives from three classical economics principles: 
Principle 1: It is a realistic portrayal of a market economy based on astute 
observation of individual behaviors and interaction in the marketplace. 
Principle 2: From Principle 1, it derives deep emergent properties that are 
unintended consequences of these latter, the results of human actions and 
not of human design.     
Principle 3: Supply and demand are classically given by an observable, oper-
ational, monetary value: the reservation price—the buyer’s maximum will-
ingness to pay (WTP) and the seller’s minimum willingness to accept (WTA).   
From these simple methodological principles, one can derive a rigorous pic-
ture of a market economy that has an integrity distinct from the neoclassi-
cal theory, as is shown elsewhere1. But this paper’s goal is more limited to 
the fundamental problem of market price formation, as explained in Chap-
ter 7 of Book 1 of Wealth of Nations (A. Smith, [1776] 1904). We explain key 
propositions of Smith’s theory of value in the light of this mathematical for-
mulation.  
 
1 This is proven in the authors’ more general, unfinished manuscript on a rehabilitation of classical eco-
nomics, to appear piecemeal in the forms of papers.    
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To understand Adam Smith’s articulation of value theory today is uneasy 
because of at least three or four obstacles, which come down to an overall 
illusion of progress in economics whereby many think of history of eco-
nomic ideas as if the present is regarded as subsuming the past, hence being 
legitimized to sit in judgment over its archaic version. The first difficulty in 
reading Adam Smith, and the classical school more generally, consists of 
treating Adam Smith’s technical contributions to price theory as being su-
perseded by those of his disciples (especially Ricardo, whose reduced for-
mulation is largely responsible for the dismissal of classical economics as a 
mere labor theory of value that ignored the demand side of price for-
mation); a fortiori, the classical school should not be viewed as subsumed 
and rendered obsolete by the neoclassical school.  The second obstacle re-
lates to the classical technical jargon (natural price, monopoly price, effec-
tual demand, etc.), which to a large extent is outmoded today, and not al-
ways for good reasons. The third difficulty in dealing with Adam Smith’s 
treatment of value relates to an equally outmoded tripartite articulation of 
value theory, which is often confused in modern commentaries. Until Mar-
shall, value theory used to be organized around three problems: (1) the 
measure of value (consisting determining a universal and invariable stand-
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ard of value); (2) the cause of value (consisting of deciding which cause, be-
tween utility and cost, is the ultimate, most primitive cause of value); (3) 
price theory proper, namely the problem of market price formation, to 
which Marshall reduce value theory. The first two problems are essentially 
metaphysical issues; yet they have been perhaps the greatest source of con-
troversies among the classical economists, and perhaps the greatest source 
of misunderstanding about classical economics: it can be shown that the 
classical economists’ obsession with labor is largely due to this scientifically 
peripheral issues, since labor was regarded to be the closest to being the 
invariable and universal value standard and ultimate cause of value (the 
first price paid for all commodities); yet none of the famous classical econ-
omists (except perhaps Ricardo) ever considered that this special status of 
labor implies that competitive market price formation amounts to a labor 
theory of value. For Adam Smith the relevance of the labor theory of value 
was confined to a hypothetical early and rude state of society, namely a 
primitive barter economy, in which all labor skills are identical (hunting 
skills, for example), land is not appropriated, and capital is non-existent as 
a separate factor of production; thus, starting from Ch. VII, Adam Smith ex-
pounded the theory of price formation from buyer-seller competition ex-
pressed in their aggregated supply and demand, which is relevant for a 
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modern economy. In fact, Ricardo is an exception in the classical school in 
his attempt to generalize the labor theory beyond the primitive case. Both 
Say and Malthus restated the classical value theory in the spirit of Adam 
Smith’s formulation (Say, 1803 [2006]; Malthus, [1820] 1836; Say, [1828] 
2010). But Ricardo had more disciples than the other classical economists!                                           
Lastly, in terms of obstacles, classical economics is largely rooted in acute 
observational of real economic phenomena, but organized in informal, un-
systematic way; but this unsystematic, nonmathematical nature does not 
make it less rigorous. Below is developed a general mathematical frame-
work implicit in classical price theory; from this framework are derived key 
propositions in classical price theory. 
2 Marshall’s View on Adam Smith  
Alfred Marshall is, of all the commentators of the history of economics, per-
haps the author who most clearly understood the pivotal contributions of 
Adam Smith to modern economics. He regarded Adam Smith as having 
launched an epoch in economics when this latter built, from a core meth-
odological principle overlooked in modern commentaries, a value theory 
that unifies all of economics ([1890] 1920, Appendix B, p. 627). This princi-
ple consists of dealing, as regards individual economic decisions, not di-
rectly with the unobservable ultimate psychological forces driving them 
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(need, desire, pleasure) but with the monetary sacrifices that people make 
in order to satisfy them: formally, their reservation prices.2 Thus, the rele-
vant concepts for demand and supply theory are the maximum money 
prices consumers are willing to pay and suppliers are willing to accept in the 
marketplace. This is a most fundamental classical principle the Marshall re-
adopted in his reformulation of neoclassical value theory, in reaction to the 
hedonistic marginal utilitarianism of Jevons and Walras, who make pleasure 
the fundamental motivating category of economics. The WTP-WTA ap-
proach to supply and demand frames value theory throughout the classical 
literature; it is also adopted, not only by Marshall, but also by the Austrian 
marginalists in their explanation of competitive market price formation 
(Inoua & Smith, 2020). In the 1950s, moreover, experimental economists, 
inspired by Marshall’s and Böhm-Bawerk’s treatments of this classical prin-
ciple, adopted it in their implementation of supply and demand functions 
(Chamberlin, 1948; V. L. Smith, 1962).  
3 Adam Smith Belittled as an Economist 
 
2 The ongoing paragraph on classical methodology is a summary of a longer development on classical 
methodology as it applies to classical supply and demand theory.  
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Unlike Marshall, however, most commentators of the history of economics 
have belittled Adam Smith’s technical contributions to value theory. A brief 
review is enough to show the extent to which even influential historians of 
economics have denigrated the classical school more generally as they in-
terpret it in neoclassical terms.                    
J. Schumpeter, for example, considered that: ‘There is no theory of monop-
oly [in the Wealth of Nations]. The proposition […] that “the price of monop-
oly is upon every occasion the highest which can be got” might be the prod-
uct of a not very intelligent layman—taken literally, it is not even true. But 
neither is the mechanism of competition made the subject of more search-
ing analysis. In consequence, A. Smith fails to prove satisfactorily his propo-
sition that the competitive price is “the lowest which the sellers can com-
monly afford to take”—to the modern reader it is a source of wonder what 
kind of argument he took for proof. Still less did he attempt to prove that 
competition tends to minimize costs, though it is evident that he must have 
believed it.’ (Schumpeter, 1954 [2006], p. 294) Likewise, G. Stigler, in his 
historical essays, portrayed the classical concepts of utility and competition 
as archaic versions of their modern formulations (Stigler, 1957, 1982). He 
viewed Smith, not as the author of a unified theory of value, but as ‘a man-
ufacturer of traditions’, one of which is simply ‘to pay no attention to the 
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formal theory of monopoly’ (Stigler, 1982). M. Blaug went further and con-
cluded that ‘Adam Smith had no consistent theory of wages and rents and 
no theory of profit or pure interest at all. To say that the normal price of an 
article is the price that just covers money costs is to explain prices by prices. 
In this sense, Adam Smith had no theory of value whatever.’ (Blaug, 1985, 
p. 39) Thus, it has become a common critique of Adam Smith that he held 
at best a confused view on value and income distribution. This misreading, 
we believe, is not solely induced by a neoclassical interpretation: it is rein-
forced by a Ricardian reading of Adam Smith, which is a lighter but similar 
bias. That is, the premise (or prejudice) that Adam Smith had a theory of 
income distribution à la Ricardo, one that is separate from value theory and 
primary with respect to it. Hence many commentators failed to see that 
Smith’s views on wages, profits, and rents are merely consequences of his 
value theory, as explained in Ch. 7.       
4 The Articulation of Smith’s Value Theory  
Today classical economics mostly refers to Ricardo’s system, which is the 
central reference in much contemporary discussion on this school; thus, as 
noted above, Piero Sraffa’s influential revival of this school is in fact a revival 
of Ricardo’s tradition (Sraffa, 1960). Adam Smith is more generally over-
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shadowed by his disciples. He is of course viewed as ‘the father of econom-
ics’; but this is in fact an ambiguous title, which in any case does not follow, 
as we just saw, from the overall appraisal of his work even by the influential 
historians of economics (see section 3). It is as if he owed his stature in eco-
nomics to an incidental reference to some ‘invisible hand’. Yet his technical 
contribution to economics, be it insisted, is often belittled today because it 
is often misunderstood. Here is indeed how he dealt with value in his mag-
num opus, Book I (whose first part, Ch. I-III on the ‘division of labor’, per-
tains to economic development).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Chapter VII is theoretically the most important portion of this book, for it 
presents the general theory of market price formation, which Smith then 
applies, in Ch. VIII-XI, to explain the wages of labor (Ch. VIII and X), the prof-
its of capital (Ch. IX and X), and the rents of land (Ch. XI). The previous chap-
ters on value, Ch. IV-VI, are merely preparatory discussions on, first of all, 
the nature of value, which starts from the fundamental distinction between 
‘value in use’, or the value a person attaches to a good in view of the good’s 
utility, and ‘value in exchange’, or the ratio at which a good exchanges for 
another (p. 30). (A convention throughout the classical school consists of 
using the term ‘value’ (without qualification) in reference to exchange-
value.) Smith then tackled the tricky problem of the standard of value (Ch. 
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V). When value is given in terms of this common measure, it is classically 
known as ‘price’, which is a much simpler notion (and so familiar one that 
the technical nature of its logical origin is easily forgotten). The problem 
then is to identify a medium that can serve as value standard. Smith first 
framed this problem in the most abstract way. He wanted a medium for 
comparing ‘the values of different commodities at all times and at all places’ 
(p. 38). Of course, this standard should be itself stable in value if it is to 
indicate the ‘real price’ of commodities. Adam Smith has already investi-
gated the ‘origin of money’ (Ch. IV), for money being the universal medium 
of exchange and unit of account in modern economies, it is the natural 
value standard; but money being variable in value, ‘money price’ or ‘nomi-
nal price’ is a poor indicator of ‘real price’ over long periods. Moreover, 
money cannot serve as the standard for ‘all times’, for it was not used in the 
primitive state of society: barter, according to Smith, was the primordial 
type of exchange (Ch. IV).                                                                                                                                                                                
There is in such speculation a clear temptation towards metaphysics, which 
Smith did not always resist, and which would obscure much of the later de-
velopment on value theory, as emphasized below. For by ‘all times’ he lit-
erally meant all the times in which value is concerned, including the ‘early 
and rude state of society’; under this absolute requirement, it is easy to see 
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that no medium except labor can be used as standard, for labor is the only 
reality that is common to all exchangeable goods at all places and all times, 
including the hypothetical moneyless era or even beyond: ‘Labour was the 
first price, the original purchase-money that was paid for all things. It was 
not by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was 
originally purchased.’ (p. 32) Thus the problem of the standard of value led 
Smith to consider the origin of value, which would be a second important 
topic in value theory. But we can even go further beyond and consider labor 
as the absolute origin of exchange-value; for whatever the primordial ex-
change was in human history, it must have indeed involved labor; assume, 
for example, that the first economic act in human history was the picking of 
a fruit: this then was the first time when emerged the phenomenon of ex-
change-value—someone has endured some labor in exchange for a fruit. 
The problem of the value standard, in other words, pushed Adam Smith on 
the verge of metaphysics: the origin of money, value, society, or even hu-
manity. This is not to say that such discussion is uninteresting, irrelevant, or 
false; but to emphasize that it is an order of enquiry beyond the science of 
value, for its truth cannot be decided positively; hence we count this prob-
lem as part of the metaphysics of value. The most difficult problems on 
value, which triggered major controversies that involved most economists 
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from Smith to Marshall, pertain precisely to this metaphysics of value. For 
the modern reader, the difficulty in reading these controversies is com-
pounded, because the different aspects of value are not often clearly dis-
tinguished. This confusion of science and metaphysics is therefore a serious 
obstacle against a modern reading of the history of value theory.     
Fortunately, there is a clear enough demarcation between these two orders 
of investigation in Adam Smith’s book. For, as already suggested, the met-
aphysics of value is mostly concentrated in Chapters 4-6, whereas the sci-
ence of value truly begins in Ch. VII (and any note thereafter on the original 
conditions of humankind is passing and merely said by way of progression 
from the simple to the complex). Smith’s pragmatism, moreover, eventually 
outweighed his metaphysics even in his preliminary speculations. For quan-
tity of labor, he noted, is an abstract reality, which is not operational in or-
dinary transactions and is not easy to measure by its heterogeneity. In prac-
tice, money is enough: money price (or monetary valuation more generally) 
regulates almost the totality of ordinary economic life. Yet Smith needed 
also, as we would say today, a way of controlling for inflation when the very 
long run is concerned; hence his long digression (in Ch. XI) on the variations 
of the currency—primarily silver—whose real value he assessed in terms of 
corn, whose price, which was then available for four centuries back, Smith 
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believed to be stable from century to century, though it fluctuates from 
year to year. Thus, he measured the real price of silver by the amount of 
corn that this currency can buy. This important practical problem is of 
course handled today by the technique of index numbers.                                                                                                             
Smith ended his preliminary discussions with a simple accounting of value, 
or ‘the component parts of price’ (Ch. VI), which is more a simplifying device 
than a necessary building block of his price theory. By construction, the to-
tal price of a good is the sum of the wages, profits, and rents that reward 
the three agents that produce this good—land, labor, and capital. So once 
price is explained in general, and wage and rent by implication, profit fol-
lows residually; thus if Smith explained the profit rate in general from the 
competition of capital (or ‘stock’), he at times derived the overall pattern of 
profits directly from that of wages, which tend to evolve inversely (Ch. IX). 
Throughout the classical literature, the idea that price corresponds to cost 
has two senses, depending on the context, and this ambivalence is mislead-
ing if not kept in mind. The first one is the obvious accounting identity just 
noted: rent is the cost associated to land; wage is that associated to labor, 
and profit (which, as emphasized below, is classically viewed as a cost) is 
that associated to capital. Thus ‘price equals cost’ here is a mere truism. 
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The second meaning corresponds to a theoretical proposition of utmost im-
portance in this school: it says that price converges to minimum cost under 
free competition. In the absolute, that is, as generalized to the whole econ-
omy, this proposition holds when the competition of landowners, of work-
ers, and of capitalists is so intense that the rent, wage, and profit rates are 
the minimum they can be, and hence prices correspond to minimum costs. 
But more realistically, this proposition holds locally, to a given market, 
when the competition on the side of supply is so intense that only the most 
efficient suppliers succeed to sell the good, and at the lowest possible price. 
We will come back to this proposition below.            
Sadly, this articulation of Smith’s investigation has been so often misunder-
stood. It is in his metaphysics of value (and other preliminary discussions) 
that many readers sought his science of value; and hence they were misled 
to find a confusing web of views (including a so-called ‘adding-up theory of 
value’, namely the mere accounting of value, which has no greater status in 
his book than any accounting identity has in contemporary economics). In 
particular, some attribute to him a ‘labor theory of value’, owing to a mere 
speculation on the primordial era of humankind: ‘In that early and rude 
state of society which precedes both, the accumulation of stock and the ap-
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propriation of land, the proportion between the quantities of labour neces-
sary for acquiring different objects seems to be the only circumstance which 
can afford any rule for exchanging them for one another.’ (p. 49) Clearly 
Smith is not thus explaining price formation in this primitive economy but 
was merely emphasizing the only objective exchange-value system that can 
be implemented therein: this is, in other words, a normative view, not a 
theory. Anyhow, as he turns to the relevant case of advanced market soci-
ety, he emphasizes so many qualifications to this simple rule that it amounts 
to an opening or passing note, after which he turned to the theory of value 
proper (Ch. VII), which is in essence as follows.     
The ‘market price’ of a good is regulated by competition of supply and de-
mand. When, moreover, the competition on the side of suppliers is free, in 
the sense of being limitless and hence the most intense, the market price 
converges to the ‘natural price’, the lowest price at which the good can sell, 
namely the lowest cost at which it can be produced and brought to market. 
Classically, ‘cost’ includes indeed all that it takes to produce and bring a 
commodity to market, including notably a ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ profit ex-
pectation, that is, a minimum profit anticipation that makes worthwhile the 
toil of production (for none will produce who does not expect at least a 
minimum profit from sale): so technically, cost is classically a synonym for 
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supplier reservation price, and by price convergence to cost or natural price, 
the classical economists meant, not convergence to zero profit, of course, 
but to zero surplus above the overall minimum acceptable profit, namely 
the natural profit rate. Smith, and all of his disciples, insisted on free com-
petition because they viewed it as a norm, and in two senses: it is classically 
the ideal case, the socially optimal state under which price are so low that 
consumers of all orders of society can afford it (in short, a state of cheap-
ness and plenty); but they also considered it to prevail reasonably in prac-
tice, more frequently than one might expect, as long as market supply is not 
artificially restricted, and even if this is so, the natural course of a market in 
the long run, is towards a removal of these barriers. All limitations to com-
petition, whether natural or artificial, are collective referred to as ‘monop-
oly’, a term whose classical meaning is so easily misunderstood that it might 
be better to avoid it altogether. The early neoclassical economists who, fol-
lowing an unfortunate innovation by Cournot, reduce monopoly to its ety-
mology: a market supplied by a lone seller. But what if this lone seller hap-
pens to be the most efficient supplier of the good, who managed to under-
sell all rivals and thus brings the price to its natural level; the etymological 
use of monopoly, in other words, is a simplistic and self-defeating; and the 
classical economists, who were thinking at a higher level of understanding 
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than their commentators and critics, have not made such mistake. Under 
monopoly, as classically understood, namely under a limitation of competi-
tion among suppliers, the market price trends to the ‘monopoly price’, or 
the maximum price that the set of all demanders are willing to pay, depend-
ing on the extremeness of the limitation of competition. The classical notion 
of ‘monopoly’ may seem peculiar to the modern reader; but it is the mod-
ern reader’s terminology that is questionable. 
As simple as it seems, this theory is fascinatingly profound by its implica-
tions. First, it is universal, in that it applies to any market, whatever its size. 
Moreover, it leads directly to the characterization of the market mechanism 
announced earlier and formally proven below: the market price of a good 
converges to a best summary of all the individual valuations of the good, 
namely the demanders’ use-values and the suppliers’ costs. This proposition 
is proven below (Section 6              
Smith’s exposition is rigorous all along, except for one conceptual lapse. At 
times, he treated the natural price as if it were a synonym of equilibrium 
price, or even the price attractor in all markets; hence his referring to the 
natural price at times as the ‘normal price’ or ‘ordinary price’, as if free com-
petition were a norm in the even stronger sense of being the normal state 
of affairs in all cases; hence also his oft-quoted yet misleading gravitation 
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metaphor, namely that market price gravitates around the natural value; 
hence finally his restricting demand to ‘those who are willing to pay the 
natural price’, in his explanation of how the price returns to equilibrium in 
response to an excess demand near this latter. All this would be benign if 
he were throughout assuming free competition, which is obviously not the 
case. Still, Smith’s formulation of the theory of value has overall hardly been 
surpassed, and he left it at a position that calls for no more than some clar-
ification, few conceptual additions, and a mathematical formulation.                            
5 The Technical Jargon of Chapter VII 
Chapter VII introduces a number of technical terms, most of which we en-
countered and explained in the previous section, but which have also been 
used in different senses that should be discussed here, since this polysemy 
has created much confusion and controversy among the classical econo-
mists themselves. We mean the concepts of cost, natural price, effectual 
demand. This polysemy, which is largely due to Adam Smith, is one of the 
major limitations of classical economics, and an important source of confu-
sion to the modern reader; it was a major source of logomachy among the 
classical economists themselves. A mathematical theory has no place for 
ambiguity of language; hence the mathematical formulation (Section 6 be-
low) adopts a unique definition, chosen among the possible meanings 
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based on consistency. In fact, for the sake of formal theory, it is perhaps 
better, while we should keep the classical concepts, which as we shall see 
are much needed, to avoid the outmoded classical terminology in favor of 
formal equivalents, as follows (not that old vocabulary is less useful, but 
because of the polysemy and the different meaning that the modern reader 
prejudges they have; that is, we are suggesting a less ambiguous, formal 
version of classical terms, not to replace it with the neoclassical jargon, 
which it would be a mistake to think is more precise than the classical one).   
We suggest the following correspondence:   
Classical term  Unambiguous version  
Cost  Seller’s reservation price 
Natural price Minimum price 
Monopoly price Maximum price 
Absolute demand 
(decided by need or desire) 
Quantity needed  
 
Effectual demand 
(decided by need, constrained by wealth) 
Quantity demanded 
    
Free competition Maximum competition on the 
supply side 
 
Here is a sketch of the different meanings attached to these terms, in al-
phabetical order.                          
Cost. Classical cost includes profit: Cost = Prime Cost + Profit = Wages + Rent 
+ Profit. Thus, the proposition Price = Cost is strictly speaking an accounting 
identity: Price  Wage + Rent + Profit. It is a mistake therefore to read this 
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mere accounting decomposition of price as a price theory (a so-called ‘add-
ing-up value theory’ and treating Adam Smith as confusing switching to var-
ious value theories from paragraph to paragraph. For example, J.-B. Say’s 
recurrent statement that ‘price cannot exceed cost of production’ obviously 
assumes cost in the broader classical sense: he is thus merely enouncing an 
identity [see, e.g., the  clear explanation by Say ([1815, 1848] 1966, Ch. VII, 
p. 31)]. But Price = Cost has a second theoretical meaning, adopted in this 
paper, which is a more important reason why cost plays such a central role 
in classical value theory, and which is the equilibrium of free competition, 
in which profit is minimum, which is by definition the natural profit rate: 
competition of firms, incumbent as well as potential entrants, drives profit 
to its minimum: price converges to minimum cost under free competition. 
Thus, in all rigor, Price = Cost in this theoretical sense means more precisely 
Price  Min Price = Min Cost = Natural Price (see definition below). As gen-
eralized to the whole economy, this proposition holds when the competi-
tion of landowners, of workers, and of capitalists is so intense that the rent, 
wage, and profit rates are the minimum they can be, and hence prices cor-
respond to minimum costs. But, more realistically, this proposition when it 
holds locally, to a given market, when the competition on the side of supply 
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is so intense that only the most efficient suppliers succeed to sell the good, 
and at the lowest possible price.                 
Effectual demand. ‘It is different from the absolute demand. A very poor 
man may be said in some sense to have a demand for a coach and six; he 
might like to have it; but his demand is not an effectual demand, as the 
commodity can never be brought to market in order to satisfy it.’ (WN 
[1776] 1904, Book I, Ch. VII, p. 58) Absolute demand corresponds to the 
quantity needed or desired, independently of affordability; effectual de-
mand, in contrast, corresponds to quantity (effectually) demanded, which 
is constrained by wealth. Thus, effectual demand is none other than the 
classical equivalent of the modern notion of demand, without the classical 
qualification, which is no longer needed since absolute demand falls in dis-
use (unfortunately). So far, so clear. But, unfortunately, Adam Smith first 
uses effectual demand, not in the general sense he intended, but in a spe-
cific context explained below (see natural price): thus ‘effective demand’, in 
the first occurrence, is restricted to ‘the demand of those who are willing to 
pay the natural price (see definition)’; then Adam Smith goes on to give the 
general idea he intended. J.S. Mill clarifies the matter as follows:        
But what is meant by the demand? Not the mere desire for the com-
modity. A beggar may desire a diamond; but his desire, however great, 
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will have no influence on the price. Writers have therefore given a 
more limited sense to demand, and have defined it, the wish to pos-
sess, combined with the power of purchasing. To distinguish demand 
in this technical sense, from the demand which is synonymous with 
desire, they call the former effectual demand. (Mill, [1848] 1965, Book 
III, Ch. II, §3, p. 465) 
Monopoly price. See natural price. 
Natural price. As used in this paper, natural price means minimum price, in 
contrast to monopoly price, the maximum price:            
The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can 
be got. The natural price, or the price of free competition, on the con-
trary, is the lowest which can be taken, not upon every occasion in-
deed, but for any considerable time together. The one is upon every 
occasion the highest which can be squeezed out of the buyers, or 
which, it is supposed, they will consent to give: The other is the lowest 
which the sellers can commonly afford to take, and at the same time 
continue their business. (A. Smith, [1776] 1904, Book I, Ch. VII, p. 63)             
That Adam Smith allows for price to be temporary below the natural price 
is not in itself a contraction to the meaning of natural price as the minimum 
price: in his characteristic realism, pushed at times to the details, he allows 
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for the producer to temporary sell units at a loss (perishable good), rather 
than incur the bigger loss of not selling at all. This paper simplifies the dis-
cussion by avoiding casual cases of sales at a loss, without loss in generality 
mathematically, moreover, since this exceptional case is easily included by 
a mere redefinition of the seller’s reservation price. But Adam Smith also 
used natural price as a synonym of: (2) cost (see definition); (3) equilibrium 
price or even attractor price (hence his oft-quoted gravitation metaphor); 
(4) ‘normal price’ or ‘ordinary price’. The justification for these other mean-
ings is a general attitude among the classical economists, which Adam Smith 
inaugurated, and which consists of treating free composition as a norm, as 
if the normal state of affairs in all markets. Thus, Adam Smith explains price 
adjustment in disequilibrium assuming supply-demand imbalances around 
the natural price; hence also his restricting effective demand (see definition) 
to ‘those who are willing to pay the natural price’. This is not a definition of 
effectual demand, but merely a specification of it in the given context.  
Scarcity. Classically, the scarcity of a good is given by the ratio between the 
overall number of units consumer need of a good and the total number of 
units of the good that can be supplied; that is, classical jargon, the ratio of 
absolute demand to absolute supply. Scarcity thus understood is an indica-
tor of competition between suppliers and demanders in a market, and is 
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therefore an indicator of the competitive price of a commodity: the scarcer 
a good (e.g. a diamond) the more competition will there among the de-
manders of the commodity, hence the greater will be its equilibrium market 
price; on the other hand, the more abundant is a good, the more competi-
tion there is among the suppliers of the good, who, by underselling each 
other to supply the relatively few customers in need of the good (e.g. wa-
ter), will bring the market price to closer and closer to its lowest possible 
value, the natural price (see definition).  
This scarcity ratio is ubiquitous in the classical school, so much so that Ri-
cardo noticed that ‘The opinion that the price of commodities depends 
solely on the proportion of supply to demand, or demand to supply, has be-
come almost an axiom in political economy’ (Ricardo, [1817] 2004, Ch. XXX, 
p. 382). But for this global, aggregate, objective measure of scarcity, the 
marginal school substituted an local, individual, subjective one: marginal 
utility, or its property of being diminishing function of the quantity an indi-
vidual possesses of a good: the more units of a good an individual already 
has, the less valuable is an additional unit to the consumer. Later, after the 
ordinal turn in the neoclassical school, this subjective relation between 
value and scarcity (diminishing marginal utility), thus rendered is irrelevant 
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to the ordinal value theory, is replaced by a more elaborate one: diminish-
ing marginal rates of substitution, the idea that the more units of a good an 
individual already has, the more units of this good he or she would be will-
ing to exchange for another more desire commodity (Hicks, [1939] 1946, 
pp. 20-22).  
Free competition. The market price of a good varies between two limits, 
min( )c max( ),p v  depending on the degree and type of competition in it. 
When competition is the most intense on the supply side, then the lowest- 
cost firms, the most efficient producers, undersell all rival firms, and the 
good sells at the lowest price, which is called the ‘natural price’: this case is 
classically known as free competition, because it happens when no con-
straint (natural or artificial) limits the capacity to supply to supply the good, 
which formally amounts to assuming that the good is infinitely abundant, 
namely / .S D  On the other extreme is maximum competition on 
the demand side, in situation of extreme scarcity, / 0,S D whereby 
the highest-value buyers outbid all the rival buyers to gain the few units 
available for sell: then the price converges to the maximum willingness of 
pay, or ‘monopoly price’. The classical concept of monopoly is a very pro-
found one, which Walras and other marginalists (following Cournot’s unfor-
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tunate innovation) misread, dismissed, and replaced with the literal mean-
ing of the term—the situation of a market supplied by a lone seller, insu-
lated from competition—which fails to capture the concept of a single seller 
as the most efficient firm that defeated all rivals by underselling them. 
Hence it is the result of maximum competition on the supply side. Classi-
cally, monopoly simply means the state of a market whose supply is so 
scarce that the price of the good is the maximum it can be. Where the ex-
treme scarcity is natural (such as a diamond or a picture by an old master), 
we have a natural monopoly. The classical economists saw the greatest evil 
and were critical of artificial monopoly, wherein the scarcity is artificially 
created through some restriction of supply or entry, whereby a seller or a 
group of colluding sellers (often protected by state-granted mercantilist 
privileges) restrict the supply of a good and entry into the market, and 
hence raise the price to its maximum to the detriment of consumers. (Nat-
ural monopoly affects only those few consumers who have both the ‘wealth 
and the fancy’ of engaging into competition over the rarity at stake.)               
Water and diamonds. Let be it said in passing the classical solution to the 
paradox of value, which was long known before Adam Smith to be solved 
by the concept of scarcity, and thus also did he explain it passingly to his 
students in his Lectures on Jurisprudence ([1763] 1869, p. 177). Water, by 
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its abundance, usually involves little or no competition to acquire; so, 
though it is a vital good, its market price is close to its natural value, which 
is relatively low. A diamond, in contrast, has a much higher price by its rar-
ity: its possession involves intense competition at the top of the distribution 
of WTP values, so its price is near its monopoly value, as would be achieved 
in an auction for example.            
6 The Mathematics of Chapter VII 
The essence of Adam Smith’s Chapter VII on competitive price formation in 
a market for a non-retradable good or service can be reduced to three as-
sumptions. The justifications and rationale of this assumptions, based on 
textual evidence, will be thoroughly expounded elsewhere in the authors’ 
follow-up papers. These three assumptions are: 
1. (Motivation) An individual is willing to trade is willing to trade, if there 
is any gain from trading (namely if there is surplus to be gained).                   
2. (The law of supply and demand) Price change and excess demand 
have the same sign.                                
3. (Short-side principle) Quantity traded is the minimum between quan-
tity supplied and quantity demanded.    
For mathematical simplicity (and merely to go directly to the main points), 
assume further a large market, namely one in which the distribution of val-
ues and costs are continuous, smooth functions, which we assume as given, 
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hence taken wealth distribution across consumers and the prices of related 
good as given.            
We adopt the following notations:  
Notation 
   :p  the market price, the standing market price in a given period.  
:c  sellers’ costs or reservation prices. 
:v  buyers’ values or reservation price. 
   :F  cumulative distribution function of costs: ( ) ( ).F x P c x  
:G  complementary distribution function of values: ( ) ( ).G x P v x  
:S market supply.  
:D  market demand.  
:Q  total quantity traded.  
:Z  market excess supply: .Z D S  
:  abundance of the good (the inverse of scarcity): / ,S D where 
(0)D D  is total (maximum) number of units demanders need of the 
good, and (by a simplifying abuse of notation) ( ),S S the total 
number of units producers can supply.  
                  
Given that the basic concept in classical price theory is the reservation price, 
the three assumptions formally amounts to saying:   
By the first assumption, market demand and market supply are respectively 
the total number of units of the good that the buyers and sellers can afford 
at the prevailing (the number of values and costs that are respectively 
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above and below the prevailing market price). In other words, market de-
mand and market supply are given by the cumulative distribution functions 
of the values and costs:                                      
 ( ) ( ),D p DG p  (1) 
 ( ) ( ),S p SF p  (2) 
where (0)D D  is total (maximum) number of units demanders need of the 
good, and (by a simplifying abuse of notation) ( ),S S the total number 
of units producers can supply.             
The second assumption, the law of supply and demand, formally reads      
 ( ) 0.
dp
Z p
dt
  (3) 
Finally, the third assumption, the short-side principle, simply says that  
 min( , ).Q D S  (4) 
Consider the following distance between the market price and the individ-
ual valuations of the good, where individual values, costs, supplies and de-
mands are indexed: 
 ( ) | | ( ) | | ( ),i i j ji jV p v p D p c p S p  (5) 
It can be shown that ( )V p  is an integral of excess supply3: 
 
3 See the authors’ follow-up paper on the theory of competitive price formation rooted 
in classical and experimental economics.  
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0
( ) (0) ( ) .
p
V p V Z x dx  (6) 
In a large market, where this function is not only continuous but also 
smooth, we have, by the chain rule: 
 ( ) .
p pdV dV d dZ p
dt dp dt dt
 (7) 
Thus, by the law of supply and demand (3), this distance between price and 
the valuations is nonincreasing (technically, it is Lyapunov function of com-
petitive price dynamics): 
 0.dV
dt
 (8) 
In fact, it can be shown that this property is more fundamental than the law 
of supply and demand, though the two laws happen to be equivalent in this 
large-market model assumed merely for simplicity. The property (8) has a 
fascinating interpretation that echoes Hayek’s intuition about the informa-
tional function of a competitive market price, which reveals the sum of in-
formation about consumers’ needs, means, tastes, and producers’ produc-
tion capacities: a sum of dispersed information not in the reach of any single 
mind. Property (8) means that the market price of a good evolves so as to 
reflect the traders’ valuations and costs better and better, until the distance 
between the market price and the distribution of values and costs is mini-
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mized. Mathematicians refer to such minimum abstractly as a Fréchet me-
dian, after the mathematician Fréchet, who generalized the concept of 
summary statistic (mean, median, mode) to abstract mathematical spaces. 
Let therefore this emergent informational optimization of the market be 
referred to as the principle of maximum information. Fascinatingly, it was 
first discovered in early experimental data as explaining well the dynamics 
of lab markets and was referred to as the ‘minimum rent hypothesis’ (V. L. 
Smith, 1962).  
Coming back to Ch. VII more specifically, the following result, illustrated in 
Figure 1, summarizes formally the key propositions of classical value theory 
heuristically derived so far. The core ingredient of the proof, not detailed in 
this paper, is none other than the PMI derived above, which guarantees di-
rectly the stability of price dynamics by a classic theorem by Lyapunov. 
Since Sraffa (1960), the labor theory of value is known to have a natural 
formulation in terms of input-output analysis. The derivation below is 
slightly different from Sraffa’s, however, in that profit (and the profit rate) 
is classically counted as a cost and does not therefore appear explicitly.  
Theorem: Consider a good traded in a large market. Then its competitive 
equilibrium price is an increasing function of its scarcity: that is, over some 
range, * ( )p f with ' ( ) 0.f The competitive price, moreover, tends to 
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the natural value, if the good is extremely abundant, and to the monopoly 
value, if the good is extremely scarce: * min( )p c as and * max( )p v
as 0.If all goods in the economy can be produced in abundant amounts, 
at proportional costs, using homogenous labor, then the natural general 
equilibrium of the economy (an equilibrium under which all goods are 
traded at their minimum prices or minimum WTA) is a Leontief price sys-
tem; hence all the goods would be priced according to the total labor in-
volved in their production: 1p* = (I A) ,  where is the vector of direct la-
bor requirement per unit of output andA is the matrix of direct material 
input requirements per unit of output (and I  being the identity matrix).      
Proof: A large-market competitive equilibrium reduces to the traditional 
market-clearing concept, defined here by the equation ( *)D v p
( *),S c p or ( *)v p ( *).c p Since each probability is between 0 
and 1, it follows 0 ( *)c p 1/ and0 ( *)v p .Thus ( *)c p 0
as  and ( *)c p 0  as 0,  implying, respectively,
min
*p c and
max
* .p v By the implicit function theorem, the equation ( *)G p ( *)F p  im-
plies that, over some interval in 
min max
,c v[ ], * ( )p f with '( )f
[ '( ) '( )] '( ) 0.G p F p F p/  (Labor theory of value) The unit cost of commod-
ity i  can be written as 
i
c
i i
w ,j ij ja p where i is the labor requirement, 
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i
w the average wage, and 
ij
a are direct nonlabor input requirements. Pro-
portional costs means that both the matrix [ ]
ij
aA  and the vector [ ]
i
 
are constant; homogenous labor implies a uniform wage rate ,
i
w w  which 
can be taken as the value standard, setting 1.w All commodities are sold 
at their minimum WTA means ,
i i
p c for 1,..., ,i n hence
i i
p ,k ik ka p
which is a Leontief price system, whose existence and uniqueness are a 
standard result [see, e.g., Meyer (2000, p. 681)]               
 
Figure 1: Price formation in a large market. The reservation prices are here exponen-
tially distributed. In (1)-(3), mean(v)=5, mean(c)=11, and scarcity=1, making for p*≈ 5. 
Idem in (4), save for min(c)=2 and scarcity=0.01. In (3)-(4) are price trajectories for 
various initial conditions.  
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Proof: A large-market competitive equilibrium reduces to the traditional 
market-clearing concept, defined here by the equation ( *)D v p
( *),S c p or ( *)v p ( *).c p Since each probability is between 0 
and 1, it follows 0 ( *)c p 1/ and0 ( *)v p .Thus ( *)c p 0
as  and ( *)c p 0  as 0,  implying, respectively,
min
*p c and
max
* .p v By the implicit function theorem, the equation ( *)G p ( *)F p  im-
plies that, over some interval in 
min max
,c v[ ], * ( )p f with '( )f
[ '( ) '( )] '( ) 0.G p F p F p/  (Labor theory of value) The unit cost of commod-
ity i  can be written as 
i
c
i i
w ,j ij ja p where i is the labor requirement, 
i
w the average wage, and 
ij
a are direct nonlabor input requirements. Pro-
portional costs means that both the matrix [ ]
ij
aA  and the vector [ ]
i
 
are constant; homogenous labor implies a uniform wage rate ,
i
w w  which 
can be taken as the value standard, setting 1.w All commodities are sold 
at their minimum WTA means ,
i i
p c for 1,..., ,i n hence
i i
p ,k ik ka p
which is a Leontief price system, whose existence and uniqueness are a 
standard result [see, e.g., Meyer (2000, p. 681)]                    
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